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claims were actual innocence and a due process violation resulting from
the trial judge's denial of O'Dell's request to inform the jury of his parole
ineligibility, the latter claim receiving the most judicial attention.
60
If the Simmons issue in O'Dell is approached from another angle,
from the angle of the Commonwealth Attorney's role, a new issue arises.
An argument can be made that when the prosecutor proceeded against
O'Dell at sentencing under the future dangerousness aggravator, aware
thatO'Dell was parole ineligible, theprosecutorengagedinprosecutorial
misconduct. "In support of his argument to the jury that nothing short of
death would be sufficient, the prosecutor emphasized petitioner's mis-
conduct when he was 'outside the prison system.' 61 In his closing
statement at the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor implied that the jury
should be concerned about O'Dell being released and posing a danger to
the community. He asked "[isn't it interesting that he is only able to be
outside of the prison system for a matter of months to a year and a half
before something has happened again?" 62 His concluding statements
reiterated that message:
[You may still sentence him to life in prison, but I ask you
ladies and gentlemen[,] in a system, in a society that believes
in its criminal justice system and its government, what does
this mean? ... [A]U the times he has committed crimes before
60 Id. at 1972.
611d. at 1979 (Stevens, 3., dissenting) (quoting App. 61).
62 O'Dell, 117 S.Ct. at 1979, n. 1 (Stevens, 3., dissenting) (quoting
App. 61).
and been before other juries and judges, no sentence ever
meted out to this man has stopped him. Nothing has stopped
him, and nothing ever will except the punishment that I now
ask you to impose.
63
There is little room for doubt that the Commonwealth Attorney
cavalierly misled and misinformed the jury in O'Dell.
Exactly this kind of misconduct was addressed in Berger v. United
States.64 In Berger, the Court characterized the prosecutor's argument
to thejury as"containing improper insinuations and assertions calculated
to mislead the jury." 65 Noting the prosecutor's special relationship to the
government, the Court described the prosecutor's proper interest as "not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."66 The Court
observed that the average jury knows of and has confidence in this
interest. "Consequently, improper suggestions [and] insinuations ... are
apt to carry much weight against the accused when they should properly
carry none."'67 The Court went on to state that the properremedy for such
prosecutorial misconduct is a new trial.68 Under the Berger Court's
reasoning, there can be little doubt that Joseph O'Dell was entitled to a
new sentencing hearing.
69
Summary and Analysis by:
Craig B. Lane
63 Id. (Stephens, J., dissenting) (quoting App. 66).
64 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
65 Berger, 295 U.S. at 85.
66 Id. at 88.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 89.
69 Joseph O'Dell was executed on July 23, 1997.
ARNOLD v. EVATT
113 F.3d 1352 (4th Cir. 1997)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On April 12, 1978, a party of four set out on an expedition to find
wild mushrooms. The party included cousins John Arnold and John
Plath, both in their early twenties, and their girlfriends, eleven-year old
Carol Ullman and seventeen-year old Cindy Sheets. 1 During their
search, they came upon Betty Gardner, a farm worker, walking along the
side of the road.2 After the party gave Gardner a ride to her brother's
home, they refused her request to take her to work. However, based on
Arnold's suggestion, the group decided to go back and kill Gardner.
3
After picking up Gardner, they took her to a remote wooded area
near a garbage dump. There, all four in the group, at one time or another,
physically assaulted Gardner. She was alternately sexually assaulted,
urinated on, stomped, beaten with a belt, hit with ajagged bottle, stabbed
1 Arnold v. Evatt, 113 F.3d 1352, 1355 (4th Cir. 1997).
2 Arnold, 113 F.3d at 1355.
3 According to testimony, Arnold proposed going back to kill
Gardner because he "didn't like niggers." Id. at 1355.
with aknife and choked with agarden hose.4 After dragging Gardner into
the woods, Arnold completed the murder by strangling her with the
gardenhose. In an attemptto misdirect thepolice, Arnold carved"KKK"
into Gardner's body.
5
Ajury found Arnold andPlath guilty ofmurderand kidnapping, and
both were sentenced to death.6 On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme
Court affirmed Arnold's conviction, but remanded the case for resen-
tencing based on improper prosecutorial argument.7 After the new jury
recommended the death penalty, the South Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed Arnold's death sentence. 8 The United States Supreme Court
denied Arnold's petition for writ of certiorari, but two Justices dissented
4 1d. at 1355.
5 Id. at 1355. Law enforcement did not find Gardner's body until
Sheets' role in the murder was discovered, and she revealed the location
of Gardner's decomposed remains. Id.
61d. at 1355.
7 State v. Plath, 284 S.E.2d 221 (S.C. 1981).
8 State v. Plath, 313 S.E.2d 619 (S.C. 1984).
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based on Arnold's Sixth Amendment claim concerning the jury view of
the crime scene.9
Arnold then filed an application for post-conviction relief in the
Beaufort County Court of Common Pleas. After the lower court denied
the application, the South Carolina Supreme Court denied Arnold's
petition for writ of certiorari. Four years later, the United States Supreme
Court granted a writ of certiorari and remanded the case to the Beaufort
County Court of Common Pleas for reconsideration on the issue of the
trial court's implied malice instruction. 10
On remand, in denying the application for post-conviction relief,
the lower court held that the malice instruction did not include an
impermissible presumption, or alternatively, that any error was harm-
less. 11 On an appeal from the denial of the post-conviction relief, the
South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that under United States
Supreme Court precedent the implied malice instruction was harmless
error.12 In 1993, the United States Supreme Court denied another
petition for writ of certiorari. 13
Later that same year, Arnold filed a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina.14 Based
on a recommendation to deny the petitionby the United States Magistrate
Judge, the United States District Judge adopted the magistrate's findings
and granted the State's motion for summary judgment. 15 Arnold
appealed the district judge's order.
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, affirmed the
district court's denial of the writ of habeas corpus, holding that (1) the
implied malice instruction was harmless error;16 (2) "the solicitors'
17
comments did not so infect the resentencing trial with unfairness as to
make the resulting sentence a denial of due process;" 18 (3) defense
counsel's exclusion from jury view of crime scene was harmless error,
19
(4) instruction that sentence must be unanimous and that jury must
unanimously find existence of any aggravating circumstances did not
create substantial possibility that jury thought it must also unanimously
agree as to existence of mitigating circumstances; 20 and (5) defendant
was not entitled to instruction regarding actual effect of life sentence.
21
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Implied Malice Instruction
A. Background
At the guilt phase of Arnold's trial, the trial court instructed the jury
that murder is "the killing of any person with malice aforethought either
9 Arnold v. South Carolina, 467 U.S. 1265 (1984).
lO Arnold v. South Carolina, 484 U.S. 1022 (1988).
11 Arnold v. Evatt, 113 F.3d at 1356.
12 Arnold v. State, 420 S.E.2d 834 (S.C. 1992).
13 Arnold v. South Carolina, 507 U.S. 927 (1993).
14 Arnoldv. Evatt, 113 F.3d at 1356.
15 The United States District Judge's order was filed on September
29, 1995. Id. at 1356.
161d. at 1357.
17 South Carolina uses the term "solicitor" in place of "prosecutor."
18Id. at 1359.
19 Arnold, 113 F.3d at 1361.
20 Id. at 1363.
21 Id. at 1363.
expressed orimplied." 22 Moreover, the trial court stated that malice may
be expressed "as where one makes previous threats of vengeance or
where one lies in wait or other circumstances which show directly that
the intent to kill was really entertained," or may "be implied from the
willful, deliberate and intentional doing of any unlawful act without just
cause or excuse, or from the use of a deadly weapon. '23 The South
Carolina Supreme Court found that this implied malice instruction
denied Arnold his due process right by erroneously shifting the burden
of proof as to malice from the prosecution to the defendant.
24
In Sandstrom v. Montana,2 5 the United States Supreme Court held
that ajury instruction which stated that, "'the law presumes that a person
intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts' violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it did not
require the prosecution to prove each element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.26 Following Sandstrom, in Yates v. Evatt,27 the
United States Supreme Court held that an implied malice instruction,
comparable to the one used in Arnold's trial, was constitutional error
subject to harmless-error analysis.28 The harmlessness standard is
whether the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury's verdict."'29 Yates explained that the reviewing
court must only determine that the error was unimportant in relation to
the other evidence which was considered by the jury, independently of
the erroneous presumption. 30 Under Yates, the reviewing courts must
ask "what evidence the jury actually considered in reaching its verdict"
and must "weigh the probative force of that evidence against the
probative force" of the erroneous presumption standing alone.
3 1
B. Yates Analysis Applied to Arnold
In applying the firstprong of the Yates two-part analysis to Arnold's
case, the court of appeals found that the jury considered the entire record
in making its decision.32 Following Yates, the court of appeals did not
attempt an inquiry into the jurors' minds, but rather, it scrutinized the
jury instructions and applied "the customary presumption that the jurors
followed the instructions in making their decision." 33 The trial court had
instructed the jurors to determine malice based on all of the evidence
presented, that any presumption of malice could be rebutted, and that
malice had to be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Based on these
instructions and the presumption that the jurors followed them, the court
of appeals found that the jury looked beyond the erroneous presumption
and weighed all of the malice evidence.
34
22 1d. at 1356.
23 Arnold, 113 F.3d at 1356.
24Arnold v. State, 420 S.E.2d at 838. The court of appeals agreed
with the South Carolina Supreme Court that the trial court's implied
malice instruction denied Arnold his due process right.
25 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
261d. at 513, 524 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)).
27 500 U.S. 391 (1991), disapproved in part on other grounds,
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,72-73 n. 4 (1991).
28 Yates, 500 U.S. at 400-02.
29 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). Based on this
standard, the court of appeals stated that, in order to obtain habeas relief,
Arnold must show "actual prejudice" resulting from the implied malice
instruction. Arnold, 113 F.3d at 1356.
30 Yates, 500 U.S. at 403.
31 Id. at 404.
32 Arnold, 113 F.3d at 1357.
33 Yates, 500 U.S. at 404.
34 Arnold, 113 F.3d at 1357.
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In response to the second inquiry outlined by the Yates analysis,
35
thecourtof appeals found thatArnold's case "reek(ed] of express malice"
and that any reasonable jury would have found malice with or without the
flawed instruction.36 The court emphasized that fourteen pieces of
evidence showing express malice on the part of Arnold existed.
37
Arnold argued that those pieces of evidence bolstered the predicate
facts of the erroneous presumptions, thereby reducing the probative force
of the evidence. Furthermore, he contended that the solicitor's allusions
to the implied malice instructions in his closing argument augmented the
probative force of the erroneous presumptions standing alone. However,
the court of appeals rejected both of the defendant's arguments, conclud-
ing that Arnold failed to "tip the scales sufficiently in his favor."3 8
Despite the court of appeal's holding that the implied malice
instruction was harmless error, there are some points to be made from the
opinion which are favorable for capital defense counsel. First, the court's
reliance on the customary presumption that juries always follow the
given instructions in making their decisions can be turned around to help
the defendant. By placing such an emphasis on the instructions, the court
is subjecting the instructions to careful scrutiny, and subsequently
potential attacks. When dealing with errors in instructions, such as the
implied malice instruction, defense counsel should examine these charges
with great care. If part of the instructions are incorrect, counsel should
question what evidence the jury actually considered in light of the
customary presumption.
Second, in addressing the second prong of the Yates analysis, the
court of appeal's language was inundated with numbers and measure-
ments. For example, the court stressed the "fourteen" pieces of express
malice evidence and the failure of Arnold to "tip the scales" in his favor.
Given such language, it is suggested that capital defense counsel apply a
similar "numbers" theory. Counsel can count the pieces of evidence
going against the defendant and those in favor of the defendant. If the
numbers work out, counsel can argue that his or her client successfully
tipped the scales in his or her favor.
39
35 Yates, 500 U.S. at 405.
36 Arnold, 113 F.3d at 1357.
37 Id. at 1357. The South Carolina Supreme Court referred to these
fourteen pieces of evidence. Arnold v. State, 420 S.E.2d at 840.
38 Arnold, 113 F.3d at 1357.
39 Gilbert v. Moore, 121 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 1997), a case that has
come down since Arnold, is an example of the scales tipping in favor of
a capital defendant. In Gilbert, the court of appeals held that the implied
malice jury instruction that erroneously shifted the burden of proof as to
malice from prosecution to defense resulted in actual prejudice to the
defendants, thereby finding harmful error. Id. at 149. The fact pattern
in Gilbert involved two half-brothers, Larry Gilbert and J.D. Gleaton,
whose appeals were consolidated into a single opinion. While driving
around one afternoon in 1977, searching for drugs, the half-brothers
decided to rob a lone attendant in a service station. Upon entering the
station, Gleaton pulled out a knife and told the attendant that it was a
robbery. A struggle ensued between Gleaton and the attendant, resulting
in Gleaton's slashing and stabbing the attendant. During the struggle,
Gilbert entered the station with a gun and shot the attendant once. As the
defendants fled the station, Gilbert grabbed a nearby pocketbook in the
station. The autopsy report revealed that the attendant died from a stab
wound which pierced his heart.
After several denied appeals, in 1996, the district court granted
the defendants' habeas corpus petitions. The district court found the
implied malice instruction, which had been presented to the jury in the
1977 guilt phase of the trial contained unconstitutional rebuttable pre-
sumptions and was not harmless error. Id. at 145-47. In affirming the
H. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Arnold alleged that, during the resentencing phase, the solicitors
undermined thejury's role as fact finderby giving theirpersonalopinions
on the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and the jury's decision.40
The solicitors allegedly emphasized Arnold's failure to testify, urged the
jury to have the "guts" to give Arnold the death penalty, hypothesized
that Arnold could escape from prison if given a life sentence, noted the
tax dollars which had been spent on the trial, and urged the jury to put
itself in the place of the victim.
4 1
According to Darden v. Wainwright,4 2 the test for misconduct by a
prosecutor is whether the remarks "so infected the trial with unfairness
as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process."43 The
factors for making a determination of whether a prosecutor's comments
district court's finding of harmful error, the court of appeals applied the
Yates two-part analysis. In support of its decision, the court emphasized
that the Gilbert solicitor offered no evidence of express malice, that the
nature of this crime was not extreme (unlike the cases cited by the State
to support its argument that the intent instructions were harmless), and
that the solicitor's reference to the implied malice instruction in his
closing heightened the prejudicial effect of the erroneous instruction.
The court of appeals discussed its holding in Arnold, but
distinguished it from the circumstances surrounding Gilbert. First, the
Arnold solicitorpresented fourteenpieces of evidence of express malice.
In contrast, the Gilbert solicitor offered no such evidence. In fact, the
court of appeals found a lack of malice on the part of the defendants,
pointing out the following facts: (1) physical evidence indicated that the
stabbings resulted from a scuffle; (2) Gilbert did not enter the station with
a gun until after the scuffle began; and (3) the attendant was still alive and
mobile when the defendants left the station. Second, the nature of the
crime inArnold was more extreme than that in Gilbert, in that the Armold
victim was sexually assaulted, beaten with a belt, hit with a bottle,
stabbed with a knife, and choked with a garden hose. Conversely, the
Gilbert defendants assaulted theirvictim, butmade no effort to ensure his
death, instead claiming it was an accident resulting from a struggle.
Third, the court of appeals did not find the Arnold solicitor's references
to the implied malice instruction in his closing argument to be suffi-
ciently prejudicial to tip the scales in favor of Arnold. However, in
Gilbert, the court found that similar references by the solicitor exacer-
bated the prejudicial effect of the erroneous instruction. The Gilbert
court noted that such an action by a solicitor is not a dispositive factor,
but in the absence of overwhelming evidence of malice, whether express
or implied, itbecomes more likely that the solicitor's use of the presump-
tion influenced the jury's determination. Id. at 149.
The court of appeals concluded that unlike the defendant in
Arnold, the Gilbert defendants tipped the scales sufficientlyin their favor
inthe inquiry of "whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in their trial
was surely unattributable to the error." Id. at 149 (quoting Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993)). Gilbert is certainly a victory for
capital defense, in that the court of appeals actually found an error
harmful. This case is a "must read" for any capital defense counsel faced
with the issue of whether an implied malice instruction is unconstitu-
tional. Counsel should pay particular attention to how the Gilbert court
distinguishes Arnold because the court itself offers some persuasive
attacks against the Arnold decision.
40 Arnold, 113 F.3d at 1358.
41 Id.
42477 U.S. 168 (1986).
43Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (quotingDonnellyv.DeChristoforo, 416
U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). Misconduct by a prosecutor during closing
argument can result in reversal of a conviction, but the fact that remarks
were "undesirable or even universally condemned" is not sufficient. Id.
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denied the defendant fundamental fairness are: (1) the nature of the
comments; (2) the nature and quantum of evidence before the jury; (3) the
arguments of opposing counsel; (4) the judge's charge; and (5) whether
the errors were isolated or repeated. 44
Truly disturbing is that theArnold case was not the first time the lead
solicitor's comments during a closing warranted appellate review. The
South Carolina Supreme Court vacated Arnold's original death sentence
because the solicitor told the jury that he would never seek the death
penalty again in Beaufort County if the jury did not recommend a death
sentence for Arnold.45 The court of appeals conceded that the solicitor
and his assistant solicitor obviously learned nothing from this condem-
nation since they repeated such misconduct at the resentencing trial.
However, the court downplayed these blatant and repeated wrongdoings
by declaring that the solicitors' remarks must be examined in the context
of the entire proceedings.
Not surprisingly, upon examination of the record of the entire trial,
the court found no support for Arnold's claim of prosecutorial miscon-
duct. The court reasoned that based upon the overwhelming evidence
supporting the imposition of the death sentence and the relative isolation
of the solicitor's inflammatory comments within his long oration,
4 6 the
misconduct by the solicitor did not infect the resentencing trial with
unfairness, thereby creating a denial of due process.4 7
In arguing that prosecutorial misconduct has occurred, capital
defense counsel should first emphasize the obligation courts have to
demand the utmost professional and principled conduct from attorneys.
The test outlined in Darden bolsters this obligation, requiring a thorough
examination of the actions of any prosecutor accused of denying a
defendant's due process. Furthermore, counsel should combat any
reliance placed on a judge's instructions to the jurors as curative of
prosecutorial misconduct. Despite apresumption that jurors fully adhere
to given instructions, it is difficult to imagine that they would not be
influenced by unfair andprejudicial remarks from someone as prominent
and powerful as the prosecutor. In Arnold, the reviewing court's
acknowledgment of misconduct by the solicitor and subsequent dis-
missal of such actions as a denial of due process can be regarded as
nothing but a condonation by the court of such wrongdoing.
44 Lawson v. Dixon, 3 F.3d 743,755 (4th Cir. 1993) (citingDarden,
477 U.S. at 182 and Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 647).
45 State v. Plath, 284 S.E.2d at 230 (1981).
46 Unfortunately though, therecordrevealsthattheleading solicitor's
inflammatory remarks were neither isolated nor limited to his closing
argument. The solicitors referred to Arnold by his nickname "Mad Dog"
throughout both the guilt trial and the resentencing trial. Arnold claimed
these references violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments by injecting an arbitrary factor into the proceedings.
Arnold, 113 F.3d at 1362. The test for an arbitrary factor claimis whether
the trial was so infected with unfairness as to make the conviction a denial
of due process. Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at
643). The Arnold court conceded that the solicitors "occasionally" used
the nickname during both trials and stated that they did not approve of
such references. Arnold, 113 F.3d at 1362. Nonetheless, with no
explanation, the court found the solicitors' use of the nickname did not
deny Arnold due process. This highly prejudicial action goes directly to
the fifth factor in the test forprosecutorial misconduct, whether the errors
were isolated orrepeated. The "Mad Dog" references, as admitted by the
court of appeals, were repeated, in that they occurred "occasionally" and
during both the guilt and resentencing trials. It is difficult to understand
how the court can turn its head from such a blatant disregard for fairness
and professional responsibility on the part of these supposed officers of
the court.
47 Arnold, 113 F.3d at 1359. The court also relied on the judge's
instruction to the jury notto be governed by sympathy, prejudice, passion
or public opinion in making its decision. Id.
M. Jury Viewing of Crime Scene
Arnold also claimed that the jury's viewing of the crime scene
during the resentencing phase constituted a Sixth Amendment violation
on the following grounds: (1) denial of his right to counsel because his
trial attorneys were excluded from going to the jury view; and (2) denial
of his right to effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorneys
did not object to their exclusion.
48
At the resentencing trial, the solicitor argued that the jury should
view the crime scene because Gardner had been murdered in a remote
area on an island off the South Carolina coast.49 Despite an objection by
defense counsel, the trial judge granted the solicitor's jury view motion,
finding the scene relevant to the kidnapping charge against Arnold.
However, the judge stipulated that neither the solicitor nor defense
counsel could attend the view, stating that he would go with the jury and
"make the provision that they would not say anything."50 No record or
transcripts of the jury view exists.
Both the district court and the South Carolina Supreme Court relied
on Snyder v. Massachusetts,51 concluding that the absence of defense
counsel at the jury view could not have prejudiced Arnold, thereby
preventing any constitutional claim. In Snyder, the United States
Supreme Court held that ajury view was not part of a trial requiring the
presence of the defendant.52 The lower courts reviewing Arnold rea-
soned that because the defendant did not have to be at the jury view, then
an exclusion of defense counsel was not inappropriate either. The court
of appeals rejected this rationale, emphasizing that in Snyder, the
presence of the defense counsel at the jury view was most likely the
reason why the Supreme Court did not find the absence of the defendant
at the jury view to be unconstitutional. 53 Instead, the court of appeals
stated, "the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the
State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out,
where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair
trial."54
Given this reasoning, the court of appeals framed its inquiry as
whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights exists in a
certain event where counsel was not present.55 The court of appeals
concluded that ajury view affords the possibility of potential substantial
prejudice to a defendant. 56 As a result, the absence of Arnold's counsel
at the jury view was found to constitute constitutional error under the
Sixth Amendment. 57 The court applied the harmless error standard to
48 Arnold, 113 F.3d at 1359.
49 1d. at 1359.
50 1d.
51291 U.S. 97 (1934).
52 Snyder, 291 U.S. at 114.
53 Arnold, 113 F.3d at 1359-60.
54 1d. at 1360 (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226
(1967)). The court of appeals stated that a right to counsel exists during
any "critical stage" of a defendant's criminal proceeding, including a
pretrial identification procedure, a preliminary hearing, a pretrial psychi-
atric examination, sentencing and an appeal. Id.
55 Id. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 227.
56 The court of appeals noted that ajury could be affected by words
or actions of officers showing the scene, by the manner in which the scene
is presented, or by the condition of the scene during the view. Further-
more, such a denial of access to information given to the jury could
reduce the efficacy of the defense counsel's advocacy. Id. at 1360.
57 Arnold, 113 F.3d at 1360. After determining this to be a
constitutional error, the court of appeals then had to decide if this was a
structural error, and thereby subject to automatic reversal or if this error
was subject to harmless-error analysis. In order to establish a new
structural error, it must be determined that the error's presence would
render every trial in which it occurred unfair. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
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determine whether the error "had substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury's verdict." 58 The court found no such
prejudicial effect to the verdict in that the crime scene view effectively
illustrated the remoteness of the kidnapping location and the view was
indicative of other evidence admitted at trial. Furthermore, the court
determined that the trial judge's presence mitigated any possible preju-
dice to Arnold.
In analyzing the issue of the jury crime scene view, there are two
importantpoints that capital defense counsel should note. First, the court
of appeals clearly recognizes that jury views should be conducted in the
presence of defense counsel. 59 Therefore, defense counsel should
always insist on being present at ajury view. The defendant has the right
to have counsel present at this stage of the trial and a denial of this right
is a violation of the Sixth Amendment. Second, although Arnold
recognizes the required presence of defense counsel, it does not provide
for any other safeguards during ajury view. Specifically, there exists no
record of transcripts of the jury view of the crime scene during Arnold's
resentencing trial. The absence of a record is particularly damaging
because so many of the standards and criteria used by the court of appeals
to determine any prejudice from this error rely so heavily on what
transpired during the view. This includes jurors' reactions, the actions
of any law enforcement or judicial officers present and the condition of
the scene at the time of the view. It is difficult to imagine how a defense
counsel can satisfy such standards and criteria with no record of what
occurred at the view.60 Hence, it is imperative that capital defense
counsel demand that both a video and audio record of the view be made
and entered into the trial record.
IV. Challenge to the Jury Instructions
In making his challenges to the jury instructions, Arnold argued that
there was a strong possibility that the jury believed it had to agree
unanimously as to the existence of any mitigating circumstance. 61 The
trial court instructed the jury that its decisions on the sentence and the
U.S. 279, 306-307 (1991). In making this determination, the court of
appeals relied on Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134 (4th Cir. 1996) (en
banc), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 765, (1997). InSherman, the courtheld that
an unsupervised visit to a crime scene undertaken by ajuror in a criminal
trial was subject to harmless-error analysis. Id. at 1137. The Sherman
court found that an unsupervised juror view does not render every trial
in which it occurs unfair. Given the Sherman decision, the Arnold court
concluded that if an unsupervised juror view is subject to harmless-error
analysis, then a supervised jury view in the absence of defense counsel
does not warrant a higherlevel of scrutiny. Arnold, 113 F.3d at 1361. The
court also noted that a reviewing court should consider the nature and
extent of the jury's activity and how that activity fit into the context of the
evidence offered at trial. Id. (quoting Sherman, 89 F.3d at 1139).
58 Arnold, 113 F.3d at 1361. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.
619,637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,776
(1946)).
59 Id. at 1361. See generally Clemente v. Carnicon-Puerto Rico
Management Assoc., 52 F.3d 383, 386 (1st Cir. 1995) (suggesting
"fundamental safeguards" that should be part of jury view).
60 Notwithstanding the absence of a record, defense counsel has an
extremely difficult time meeting these standards and criteria because
they are founded on the thoughts and feelings of a jury.
61Arnold, 113 F.3d at 1363. Arnold also made two otherchallenges
to the trial court's instructions to thejury: (1) his due process rights were
violated by the trial court's refusal to give a requested instruction
regarding the actual effect of a life sentence or a death sentence; and (2)
existence of any aggravating circumstances must both be unanimous.
Arnold claims thatbecause of these instructions, a substantial possibility
exists that the jury thought it also had to reach a unanimous decision on
the existence of any mitigating circumstances.
62
The court of appeals rejected Arnold's "substantial possibility"
argument, finding that the jury instructions never required the jury to
determine any mitigating factor with unanimity. 63 Furthermore, the
court stated that the probability of jury confusion on the issue of
unanimity was not substantial.64
Despite the fact that this claim was unsuccessful, capital defense
counsel shouldunderscorethepointthatmitigating circumstances do not
have to be determined by unanimity. Arnold may not have been able to
use this point in his favor, but there are certainly occasions in which
defense counsel will want to remind the jury of its contents.
V. The Cumulative Effect of the Alleged Errors
Arnold's final argument centered around a tally of all the errors he
alleged occurred in the jury instructions. He argued that the cumulative
effect of all the trial court's alleged errors in its instructions rendered his
sentence of death unreliable based on the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 65 Not surprisingly, the court of appeals quickly rejected
this claim, giving no explanation.
This case raises the issue of not just the cumulative effect of the
alleged errors in the instructions, but the cumulative effect of all of the
alleged errors throughout the proceedings. The pages of the Arnold
opinion are filled with acknowledgments of errors, and then subsequent
cursory findings of harmlessness. It is difficult to understand how the
court could review all of the errors, both alleged and confirmed, and not
atleast contemplate how this trial was anything but a series of errors, void
of any sense ofjustice. The only explanation is that the court ignored the
totality of the circumstances, instead choosing to compartmentalize each
of the issues. This opinion is another example of result-oriented judicial
review with the result being the rendering of very little justice.
Summary and Analysis by:
Mary K. Martin
the failure to give a curative instruction concerning the admission of
Cindy Sheets' immunity agreement injected an arbitrary factor into the
proceedings. The court of appeals rejected the due process claim, finding
that therule from Simmons v. South Carolina required such an instruction
only if the defendant is parole ineligible. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512
U.S. 154, 177-79 (1994) (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). The court found nothing to
indicate Arnold would have been parole ineligible, and even if it had, the
court stated it could not apply the Simmons rule retroactively. Arnold,
113 F.3d at 1363. The court also denied Arnold's claim concerning the
curative instruction, determining that Arnold was not denied fundamen-
tal fairness. Id. at 1364.
62 Id. Arnold based his arguments on the United States Supreme
Court's decisions in McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990) and
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
63Id.
641d. See Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66 F.3d 1350,1364 (4th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1575 (1996).
65 Id. at 1364.
